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Towards better energy-efficiency policy implementation and alleviation of energy poverty: Introducing the “ENPOR” tool to quantify implications of the split incentive barrier in the European Union’s private rented sector

Panel: 3. Policy, finance and governance

This is a non-peer reviewed extended abstract. No paper available.

Authors:
Dimitris Papantonis, Technoeconomics of Energy Systems laboratory (TEESlab) - University of Piraeus Research Center (UPRC), Greece
Christos Tourkolias, Center for Renewable Energy Sources & Saving, Greece
Vlasios Oikonomou, Institute for European Energy and Climate Policy Stichtung (IEECP), The Netherlands
Vassilis Stavrakas, Technoeconomics of Energy Systems laboratory (TEESlab) - University of Piraeus Research Center (UPRC), Greece
Alexandros Flamos, Technoeconomics of Energy Systems laboratory (TEESlab) - University of Piraeus Research Center (UPRC), Greece

Abstract

“Split incentives” refer to any situation in which the benefits of a transaction do not accrue to the actor that pays for the transaction. In the building sector, split incentives are typically linked with cost recovery issues related to energy-efficiency upgrade investments due to the failure of effectively distributing financial obligations and rewards between involved actors. Especially in the Private Rented Sector (PRS), which accommodates the 30% of the European Union (EU)’s housing, split incentives among landlords and tenants, or the “Landlord-Tenant” dilemma, is one of the main barriers when it comes to energy-efficiency policy implementation, and alleviation of energy poverty. This article aims to address this barrier by introducing the “Split Incentives Quantification Tool” (Q-SpliT), developed under the European Commission (EC)-funded Horizon 2020 “ENPOR” project.

The tool’s main objective is to identify the share of the triggered benefits among landlords and tenants due to the implementation of energy-efficiency policy programmes. To do so, the tool focuses on quantifying energy savings and positive externalities triggered by energy-efficiency interventions to identify an “optimal” allocation of costs, or subsidy rates for each side, towards the better design, financing, and implementation of energy efficiency policies that could also support the alleviation of energy poverty towards a just and fair transition for all. To test and demonstrate its applicability, the tool is currently further developed and used in real cases across the EU, in the context of the EC-funded LIFE “RENOVERTY” project. Overall, our work suggests key implications, which, if acted upon, could support overcoming of existing barriers, provide useful insights to all key actors, and enhance the deployment of well-designed and well-targeted policies across the EU’s PRS.

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