Columnists: Dario Di Santo, FIRE
Published on: 13 Oct 2026
Designing energy policies that work: lessons from Italian White Certificates, Part 1
Why do some policies work well for a certain period and then run into difficulties? And why do others, even when they appear well designed on paper, struggle to get off the ground? The answer does not necessarily depend on the soundness of their objectives or the technical potential available. What often matters more is how rules, markets, market actors and institutions interact over time.
The Italian experience with White Certificates – also known in Italy as Titoli di Efficienza Energetica, or TEE – offers useful insights. The scheme has operated since 2005, generating more than 30 million tonnes of oil equivalent (toe) in cumulative energy savings, while going through rapid growth, a severe crisis and, more recently, a gradual recovery. Its evolution – which I recently explored in a paper presented at the eceee summer study – offers lessons that go well beyond White Certificates.
Technical potential is not enough
The first lesson concerns the difference between the theoretical potential for energy savings and the actual capacity of a policy mechanism to turn that potential into projects. This distinction played an important role in the crisis experienced by the Italian scheme.
Over the years, its rules became progressively more stringent. This culminated in the 2017 reform, driven by the need to address fraud, ensure additionality and proper measurement and verification of savings (M&V), and reduce the over-remuneration of certain measures. These were reasonable objectives, but they were translated into an excessively restrictive approach without sufficiently assessing the impact on supply.
Stricter requirements for eligibility, baseline definition and M&V made projects increasingly complex, time-consuming and risky. At the same time, targets continued to reflect a capacity to generate certificates developed under very different conditions. The resulting demand-supply imbalance eventually put the system under severe strain and drove prices from around €100-110 per certificate to peaks approaching €500.
This suggests that when a policy is drifting in undesirable directions – because of excessive remuneration, fraud or support for suboptimal measures – corrective action may need to be decisive, but the transition must also allow the market to absorb the changes without placing operators under excessive strain.
More importantly, technical potential and the actual supply of projects do not coincide. Between an energy efficiency opportunity and the issuing of White Certificates there must be a company willing to invest, an ESCo or consultant capable of developing the project, rules to interpret, measurements to carry out and an application to approve. Policy targets need to take these factors into account.
This is also why more rigour does not necessarily mean greater effectiveness. Robust M&V is one of the main strengths of the Italian scheme: it links incentives to savings that have actually been achieved and measured. But highly complex baselines, demanding measurement requirements or lengthy procedures can improve the accuracy of an individual project while reducing the number of projects submitted. A scheme that delivers substantial results while tolerating some non-critical imperfections may therefore be preferable to one that is extremely precise but delivers poor value for the resources spent.
The issue is not choosing between rigour and simplification. It is deciding how much additional rigour is worthwhile compared with the costs and barriers it introduces, and providing adequate support. The more complex the procedures, the stronger the accompanying measures implemented by the managing agency should be: clear guidelines, dialogue before and after project submission, information and training.
It is no coincidence that with the Italian scheme the situation improved after the changes introduced in 2021 and 2025. These retained a scheme largely based on measured savings while simplifying procedures where stricter requirements did not deliver proportionate benefits, and strengthening support for operators.
Complexity also implies a longer learning curve and a slower initial ramp-up. This matters particularly for short-lived schemes, such as regional funds, measures financed under the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP), one-off funding calls and similar instruments. If rules are new and complex, there may simply not be enough time for market actors and public authorities to learn how the procedures work before the measure ends, unless such rules build on mechanisms that are already familiar and tested in other schemes.
What this first lesson tells us
The first challenge in designing an effective policy is therefore not simply to identify technical potential or set an ambitious target, but to build a workable path between that potential and actual projects. This requires proportionality between rigour and transaction costs, clear rules, adequate support and enough time for the system to learn.
But generating projects is only part of the challenge. Once a scheme is in place, how can it maintain confidence, respond to imbalances and adapt without undermining regulatory stability? These are the issues I will address in a second article, again drawing on the Italian White Certificate experience.










